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ABSTRACT 
 
LESLIE ROBINSON: Do Firms Pay for Earnings Classification? 
Effects of Financial Reporting on the Market for Housing Tax Credits 
(Under the direction of Doug Shackelford) 
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the relative importance to managers of pre-tax 
and after-tax earnings. I exploit features of investments in housing tax credits and GAAP 
accounting for those investments. When managers purchase tax credits, accounting rules 
reduce book earnings for the cost of the tax credits through either i) a pre-tax loss, or ii) a tax 
expense. Identically priced tax credit investments result in the same net increase to after-tax 
earnings regardless of the accounting method used. By analyzing the market price of tax 
credits using a confidential database, I find a premium on tax credits that reduce book 
earnings through tax expense, thereby avoiding a reduction to pre-tax earnings. This result 
suggests that managers are willing to sacrifice after-tax earnings, by paying a higher tax 
credit price, to avoid reductions to pre-tax earnings. On average, I estimate that managers 
reduce after-tax earnings by $1 to avoid a reduction to pre-tax earnings of $13. This is the 
first study to my knowledge to suggest that some firm managers place more importance on 
pre-tax earnings than after-tax earnings.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the relative importance to managers of pre-tax 
and after-tax earnings. Using a simple example to frame the research question, I examine 
whether managers prefer to report $700 of after-tax earnings as either i) $900 of pre-tax 
earnings and income tax expense of $200, or as ii) $1,000 of pre-tax earnings and tax 
expense of $300. Accounting method ii) shifts a $100 reduction in pre-tax earnings down the 
income statement, reporting the item instead as a tax expense. Using a confidential database, 
I analyze the market price of low-income housing tax credits (LIHTCs) and find that a higher 
LIHTC price is associated with investments that qualify for accounting method ii). This 
result suggests that managers are willing to sacrifice after-tax earnings, by paying a higher 
LIHTC price, to avoid a reduction to pre-tax earnings. On average, I estimate this behavior 
has the effect of exchanging $1 of cash (i.e., after-tax earnings) for $13 of pre-tax earnings.  
  The contribution of this study is the finding that managers appear willing to incur 
cash costs to shift a pre-tax expense down the income statement to tax expense. McVay 
(2006) finds opportunistic downward shifting of core expenses to special items on the 
income statement. While McVay (2006) validates classification shifting on income 
statements as a valid form of earnings management, it assumes that classification shifting 
bears a low cost relative to other forms of earnings management. Therefore, McVay (2006) 
                                                 
1 Throughout this study, any reference to “investor” implies tax credit investor, or end-user of the purchased tax 
benefits. Reference to “after-tax earnings” means bottom-line net income on the income statement. Reference to 
“pre-tax earnings” means pre-tax financial accounting income, before items reported net-of- tax, and income tax 
expense on the income statement. 
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does not address the question of whether managers are willing to incur cash costs to move 
expenses down the income statement.  Engel et. al. (1999) provides small sample evidence 
that firms incur costs to shift the balance sheet classification of a security from debt to equity. 
While Engel et. al. (1999) provides evidence suggesting firms incur costs to alter their debt-
to-equity ratio, it does not shed light on firms’ willingness to pay for earnings classification. 
Furthermore, as opposed to leverage, a widely accepted relatively well-understood 
performance measure, the conjecture and finding that managers prefer to report higher pre-
tax earnings, when after-tax earnings are the same, raises questions for future research about 
the implications of pre-tax and after-tax components of earnings on valuation and perceptions 
of firm performance. 
  Extant accounting literature provides at least four reasons why managers would care 
about reporting higher pre-tax earnings even if after-tax earnings are the same. First, Gleason 
and Mills (2006) suggests that the stock market grants a relatively higher (lower) reward to 
firms meeting after-tax earnings forecasts by reporting higher pre-tax earnings (lower tax 
expense). Second, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) finds evidence consistent with analysts 
viewing effective tax rate (ETR) related changes in after-tax earnings as transitory. Holding 
after-tax earnings constant, reporting higher (lower) pre-tax earnings results in lower (higher) 
ETR related changes in after-tax earnings. Third, evidence from prior research suggests that 
users of financial statements view earnings components as more (less) permanent the higher 
(lower) they appear on the income statement (McVay 2006; Lipe 1986; Fairfield et. al 1996). 
Therefore, pushing expenses down the income statement should positively alter perceptions 
of performance. Finally, Francis et. al. (2003) finds that earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) have incremental explanatory power over after-tax 
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earnings in explaining stock returns.2 While it is difficult to place a dollar value on any of the 
potential benefits to reporting higher pre-tax earnings, I estimate how much firms are willing 
to pay for the desired classification. 
  There is also ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that managers are sensitive to the 
financial reporting effects of LIHTC investments. For example, Buzz Roberts, Vice President 
for Policy, Local Initiatives Support Corporation, made the following statement in a 
memorandum to the Millennial Housing Commission dated April 16, 2001:3 
“Publicly-held corporations, which comprise almost the entire  
[LIHTC] market today, express a clear dislike for tax 
deductions. Tax deductions show up on their books as losses, 
which reduce earnings. It is not practical for them to have to 
explain to their stockholders that these losses are actually good. 
Tax credits pose no such problem.” 
 
Industry participants claim LIHTC investments that qualify for accounting method ii) appeal 
to investors because the losses do not have to be recognized against pre-tax income on 
corporate financial statements (www.housingfinance.com). There is also anecdotal evidence 
that analysts place relatively more weight on pre-tax earnings. A former investment banker, 
now sell-side analyst with Merrill Lynch, Mike J. Linenberg states, “In investment banking, 
we were most interested in the line items below earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) or 
operating income. There we would focus on transactions that were tax efficient and would 
help reduce interest expense…As equity analysts, we principally focus above EBIT.”4 
                                                 
2 The use of EBITDA in stock valuation is relevant here because “pre-tax earnings,” for purposes of this study, 
is comparable to any earnings measure that excludes income tax expense. 
 
3 The Local Initiatives Support Corporation is the parent company of the National Equity Fund, a sponsor of 
LIHTC investments. Congress charges the Millennial Housing Commission with examining methods for 
increasing the role of the private sector in providing affordable housing in the United States. The memorandum 
is at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/focus.html.  
 
4 Wall Street Research Online, Sell-Side Forum, March 7, 2002. 
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Therefore, even if the net income of two firms is the same, analysts distinguish between pre-
tax and after-tax earnings components and are likely to value them differently. 
  This study concludes with an additional analysis that further supports the finding that 
higher LIHTC prices are associated with accounting benefits. Specifically, I examine 
investor heterogeneity in the coordination of cash flow and accounting earnings. I find 
evidence to suggest that firm managers are less (more) willing to reduce the present value of 
their accounting earnings to increase the present value of their cash flow when they do (not) 
pay for higher pre-tax earnings. There are two implications of this result. First, this further 
supports the notion that managers paying for higher pre-tax earnings focus on the accounting 
earnings impact of the investment rather than cash flow. Specifically, these managers do not 
appear to value additional tax savings when accounting earnings (or the accounting effective 
tax rate) do not reflect this additional value. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that 
corporate tax directors value permanent, rather than temporary, differences between 
accounting earnings and taxable income because temporary differences do not lower the 
accounting ETR (Neubig 2006). Second, this finding suggests that some firm managers value 
cash flow from tax savings more than accounting earnings, consistent with the finding in 
Guenther, Maydew and Nutter (1997). Overall, firm managers in this setting are diverse in 
their coordination of cash flow and book earnings. 
 I organize the remainder of the paper as follows: Section 2 provides relevant 
institutional details and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis and 
main results. Section 4 analyzes the economic significance of the empirical results. Section 5 
presents additional analysis and Section 6 concludes. 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1  LIHTC Accounting 
 An investor purchases LITHCs by committing equity capital as a limited partner to a 
qualified real estate project.5 The investor forgoes traditional claims to cash flow and 
appreciation from the underlying real estate, in exchange for the right to receive tax benefits. 
Tax benefits received are the LIHTCs (i.e., tax credits) and operating losses generated by the 
underlying real estate (i.e., tax deductions), generally over a period of 10 years.6 Tax credits 
and tax deductions both generate cash flow through tax savings for the investor. However, 
these tax benefits have different implications for financial accounting earnings.  
Tax savings from tax credits provide a dollar-for-dollar decrease to federal income 
tax expense. When an investor buys 100 tax credits, he is effectively buying the right to 
deduct $100 from the tax liability reported on his firm’s federal tax return. This offset 
converts the 100 tax credits into $100 of cash by reducing cash taxes paid to the Internal 
Revenue Service. Thus, tax credits increase after-tax earnings by $100 with no effect on pre-
tax earnings.  Tax savings from tax deductions provide a decrease to federal income tax 
expense by an amount equal to the tax deduction times (1-marginal tax rate). While tax 
savings from tax deductions reduce tax expense, the deduction amount reduces pre-tax 
                                                 
5 Limited partnerships facilitate the buying and selling of tax benefits. See Wolfson (1985) for a discussion of 
the benefits of limited partnership arrangements commonly used in tax-advantaged investments.  
 
6 Affordable rental housing projects generate operating losses because interest and depreciation deductions 
exceed reduced rental income. 
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earnings. The investor records an investment on the balance sheet equal to the capital 
contribution, and reduces the carrying amount through decreases to pre-tax earnings as he 
receives his allocable share of partnership operating losses. Total tax deductions from 
operating losses reflected in pre-tax earnings over the life of the investment is equal to the 
amount of equity capital contributed (i.e., the cost of the LIHTCs).  
 This accounting treatment has the effect of reporting the revenue from the investment 
as a reduction to tax expense (i.e., from both the tax credits and tax deductions), while the 
cost of the investment is reported as a reduction to pre-tax earnings. Consider two firms with 
$1,000 in sales revenue and a marginal tax rate of 35 percent. Firm N buys no LIHTCs, while 
firm P buys 100 LIHTCs for $80. A simple income statement appears as follows:  
       
      Sales 
N 
1,000
P 
1,000
 
      LIHTC losses n/a (80) cost=capital contribution of $80 
      Pre-tax earnings (a) 1,000 920  
      Tax expense (b) 350 222 revenue=tax benefits of  
100+80(1-.35)=$128 
      After-tax earnings 
      Effective Tax Rate (b/a) 
650 
.35 
698 
.24 
 
 EITF 94-1, Accounting for Tax Benefits from Investments in Affordable Housing 
Projects, sets forth a criterion that, if met, changes the accounting treatment of the tax 
deductions. Specifically, if “the availability of the tax credits allocable to the investor is 
guaranteed,” investors report tax deductions as increases to tax expense, rather than as 
reductions to pre-tax earnings. Section 2.3 discusses the implications of “guarantees.” This 
accounting treatment has the effect of reporting net revenue from the investment as a 
reduction to tax expense, with no reduction to pre-tax earnings. Now compare N and P to 
firm A that buys 100 guaranteed LIHTCs for $80. 
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      Sales 
N 
1,000 
P 
1,00
0 
A 
1,00
0 
 
      LIHTC losses n/a (80) (0)  
      Pre-tax earnings (a) 1,000 920 1,00
0 
 
      Tax expense (b) 350 222 302 net revenue=128-80=$48 
      After-tax earnings 
      Effective Tax Rate (b/a) 
650 
.35 
698 
.24 
698 
.30 
 
I herein refer to the accounting method used by firms P and A as pre-tax and after-tax 
accounting, respectively.7 
 Accounting literature provides at least four reasons why corporations should prefer 
the income statement of A to that of P, thereby making the market for LIHTCs a useful 
setting to study this preference. The first two come from literature on the interaction between 
tax accounting and reporting and valuation. First, Gleason and Mills (2006) provide evidence 
that the stock market discounts the reward to meeting or beating after-tax earnings forecasts 
when the company achieves the target using a decrease to tax expense. This finding suggests 
that P’s reward for meeting an earnings target of $698, for example, would be discounted 
more then A’s reward for meeting the same earnings target because a greater percentage of 
P’s increase to after-tax earnings was achieved through a decrease to tax expense. Second, 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) investigate the effect of a change in the effective tax rate (ETR) 
on stock returns and find that the relation between ETR-related earnings changes and stock 
returns was significantly negative. This evidence is consistent with anecdotal evidence that 
analysts view ETR-related earnings changes as transitory.8 Using firm N as a benchmark, a 
                                                 
7 EITF 94-1 refers to the accounting methods used by corporations P and A as the equity and effective yield 
method of accounting, respectively. 
 
8 Analysts often view changes in ETRs as a way for companies to meet earnings estimates, and not as a 
reflection of changing business conditions. See for example “Tricky Tax Moves Can Boost Profits: It’s a 
Dubious Way to Meet Forecasts” in USA Today, October 24, 2003, p.1B. 
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greater portion of the $48 increase to after-tax earnings for P comes from ETR-related 
changes, which analysts view as transitory, even though P’s ETR change from the LIHTC 
investment will persist for 10 years.  
 Two additional reasons why corporations should prefer the income statement of A to 
that of P come from literature on earnings management and the valuation of earnings 
components. First, evidence from previous empirical studies indicates that users of financial 
statements value components of earnings differently (e.g., Lipe, 1986; Fairfield et. al., 1996; 
Davis, 2002; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; McVay, 2005). A common theme in this literature 
is that managers believe earnings classification affects expectations of financial statement 
users even though shifting expenses down (or revenue up) the income statement does not 
affect bottom-line earnings. P’s income statement reports costs in pre-tax earnings and 
revenues as a reduction to tax expense. After-tax accounting gives investors the ability to 
shift the expense down the income statement, reporting only net revenue in tax expense. 
Thus, classification of expenses above revenues using pre-tax accounting could have 
negative valuation implications if items higher (lower) on the income statement are viewed 
as more (less) persistent. Finally, Francis et. al. (2003) finds that EBITDA has incremental 
explanatory power over net income in explaining stock returns. EBITDA for P (A) is $920 
($1,000) even though after-tax earnings are the same for both firms. Consistent with this 
finding, after-tax accounting would be preferred where a manager believes EBITDA, or a 
combination of EBITDA and after-tax earnings, are being used to value his firm’s shares.9 
                                                 
9 Most analysts interviewed by the FASB in 2002 noted that EBIT and EBITDA were key performance metrics 
used to assess a company’s performance. http://www.fasb.ord/project/interviews.pdf  
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2.2 Demand and the market for LIHTCs 
 Market demand for LIHTCs comes primarily from publicly held corporations in the 
utilities and financial services industries. The data used in this study show that from 1987 
through 1993, 33 (67) percent of demand for LIHTCs came from corporate (individual) 
investors. From 1994 through 2005, 88 (12) percent of demand came from corporate 
(individual) investors. This shift in demand resulted from increased corporate interest in the 
LIHTC program following the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, which made the LIHTC 
program a permanent (as opposed to temporary) tax incentive program. 
 I obtain an industry composition of corporate investors by searching SEC filings for 
the term “housing tax credit.” This search produced 339 distinct investors primarily 
concentrated in two industries: 76 percent financial services (i.e., SIC codes 6000-6411) and 
14 percent utilities (i.e., SIC codes 4900-4999).10 The remaining 10 percent include mining, 
food, textile, chemical, extractive, durables, computers, transportation, retail, insurance, and 
services.11 Thus, nearly 20 percent of all LIHTC investors operate in industries where 
analysts often claim EBITDA to be an important performance metric in valuing firms (i.e., 
utilities, mining, food, textile, extractive, durables, retail, and transportation). 
 LIHTC purchasing behavior also characterizes corporate investors. Most corporate 
investors make relatively infrequent and small purchases of LIHTCs. However, a small 
number of large firms make relatively frequent and high volume purchases of LIHTCs 
because these investments satisfy their regulatory mandates to invest in low-income 
communities. In 2002, Fannie Mae reported spending $1.6 billion on LIHTCs, purchasing 
                                                 
10 The finding of 339 distinct investors is consistent with survey evidence from Cummings and DiPasquale 
(1997) that states approximately 300-400 corporations have invested in LIHTCs. 
 
11 I use the same industry classifications as in Barth et al. (1999). 
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approximately 20 percent of all LIHTCs available that year.12 The market for LIHTCs 
differentiates among these investors by referring to the former as “multi-investor” and the 
latter as “proprietary.”  
 Financial reporting should affect the market price of LIHTCs for multi-investors, but 
not proprietary investors, such as Fannie Mae. The reason is that proprietary investors report 
LIHTC investments in the financial statements such that the information provided causes the 
difference between pre-tax and after-tax accounting to become immaterial. Fannie Mae, for 
example, specifically disclosed that pre-tax earnings include net losses on certain affordable 
housing tax-advantaged equity investments totaling $225, $222, and $188 million in 2002, 
2001, and 2000, respectively.13 These losses reduced pre-tax earnings for Fannie Mae by 3.6, 
2.3, and 3.1 percent for these years.   
 In addition to disclosing the losses as a separate line item in pre-tax earnings, 
proprietary investors may report non-GAAP taxable-equivalent adjustments (TEAs) for 
LIHTCs. It is a widely used practice in the financial services industry to report TEAs for tax-
exempt investments, which have the effect of increasing both pre-tax earnings (i.e., reporting 
interest income as if it was fully-taxable) and tax expense, with no affect on after-tax 
earnings. Because the revenue from LIHTC investments comes in the form of tax credits, the 
income is effectively tax-exempt. Following from the previous example, the TEA for 
LIHTCs would appear as follows:  
                                                 
12 www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2003 
 
13 Freddie Mac, Bank of America and Bank One (reported by sponsors to be proprietary end-users) also report 
losses from equity investments in affordable housing as a separate line item in pre-tax earnings. This 
information makes it easier for users of financial statements to “undo” the effects of these losses on pre-tax 
earnings when comparing and evaluating performance. 
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      Sales 
P 
1,000 
 A 
1,000 
 
      LIHTC losses (80)  (0)  
      Pre-tax earnings (a) 920  1,000  
      TEA 
      Adj. pre-tax earnings 
      Adj. Tax expense (b) 
154 
1,074 
376 
[100/(1-
.35)] 
74 
1,074 
376      
[48/(1-.35)] 
      After-tax earnings 
      Effective Tax Rate (b/a) 
698 
.35 
 698 
.35 
 
 This adjustment has the effect of placing the revenue (i.e., from the LIHTCs that is 
currently reported in tax expense) in pre-tax earnings grossed-up by (1-.35). For example, the 
non-GAAP TEA adjustment made by Fannie Mae for LIHTC investments increased pre-tax 
earnings by $594, $584, and $430 million in 2002, 2001, and 2000, respectively. 
2.3  Supply and the market for LIHTCs 
 The supply of LIHTCs to corporations generally comes from investment sponsors. 
The market for LIHTCs is characterized as a distribution channel with a producer (i.e., 
housing developers that receive LIHTC allocations from the government), an intermediary 
(i.e., an investment sponsor), and a consumer (i.e., the investor). Sponsors create a 
marketplace through which developers receive cash for their LIHTC allocations from 
corporations that enjoy reductions in their federal income tax liability from the LIHTCs. 
Sponsors buy tax credits from developers at wholesale prices, and then resell the LIHTCs 
through various distribution channels at retail prices. The difference between the wholesale 
and retail market price of an LIHTC represents the sponsors load for performing asset 
management, compliance, and reporting functions over the life of the investment 
 There are effectively four distribution channels through which sponsors buy and sell 
tax credits: First, there are multi-investor and proprietary distribution channels, which serve 
the two types of investors discussed above. Second, there are (unguaranteed) guaranteed 
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distribution channels, which serve corporations (not) demanding guarantees. To meet 
demand for LIHTCs in each of these distribution channels, sponsors bid for a fixed supply of 
tax credits from developers each year. End-user behavior drives any distribution channel, and 
therefore, sponsors consider the resale distribution channel when bidding on LIHTCs. 
 Guarantees act like insurance policies on the LIHTC investment, effectively 
transferring real estate risk into investment-grade credit risk. If the underlying real estate 
generating the LIHTCs enters into foreclosure before the expiration of a required 15-year 
holding period, the investor recaptures a portion of the LIHTCs taken on past tax returns plus 
interest and loses any remaining LIHTCs. Sponsors supply guarantees for a fee generally by 
forming a relationship with an investment grade firm in accordance with a risk and fee-
sharing arrangement. See Figure 1a for a diagram of the LIHTC market structure. 
 In theory, corporations demand guarantees to indemnify themselves against the loss 
of LIHTCs. However, there are three important observations worth noting about the market 
for guarantees. First, a market for guarantees does not exist for individual investors. Second, 
corporate demand for guaranteed LIHTCs increased sharply from 1995 to 1996 from 15 to 26 
percent of all LIHTCs, the same time EITF 94-1 became effective.14 Third, the foreclosure 
rate on LIH real estate projects since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced the LIHTC 
program is .01 percent annually, nearly 50 times lower than market-rate apartments [E&Y 
2002]. Each of these observations supports the notion that demand for guarantees is largely 
accounting based. 
                                                 
14 The FASB finalized EITF 94-1 in May 1995. These data are likely to understate this increase because it 
represents only primary market guarantees. Secondary market guarantees exist when firms buy unguaranteed 
LIHTCs, guarantee some portion of the investment, and resell the LIHTCs to firms demanding guarantees. 
Secondary market guarantors have included such firms as Zurich Insurance, Keycorp, Bank One, Fannie Mae, 
Edison Capital, Hartford Insurance, DQE Financial, and XCEL Energy. 
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2.4 Hypothesis development 
 According to one investor, “People see the value of receiving a guarantee. There is 
better accounting treatment and a lack of real estate worries” (Journal of Tax Credit Investing 
2003). If investors place a value on the guarantee that is higher than sponsors’ cost of 
supplying the guarantee (i.e., because they value the accounting benefits), sponsors will earn 
what I refer to as an “accounting premium.” In the bidding process through which sponsors 
obtain LIHTCs in the wholesale market, I examine whether this accounting premium affects 
the market price of LIHTCs.   
 When sponsors purchase LIHTCs for unguaranteed (guaranteed) distribution 
channels, I hereafter refer to these as (pre-tax) after-tax LIHTCs. This analysis leads to the 
principal hypothesis tested in this study, stated in the alternate form: 
 H1A:      Sponsors pay more for after-tax compared with pre-tax LIHTCs in the multi-
investor, but not the proprietary, distribution channel. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Model development 
 To test the hypothesis developed above, I estimate a regression of LIHTC price on 
distribution channel indicator variables, an interaction term, and control variables for risk 
differences in the underlying real estate.  I use a pooled OLS regression, controlling for 
temporal variations in price and unobserved heterogeneity among sponsors by including year 
and sponsor fixed effects. 
LIHTC priceijt =  β0 + β1Proprietaryijt + β2After_Taxijt+ β3Proprietary*After_Taxijt + 
 β4Regionijt +  β5Tenantijt + β6Financingijt + β7Locationijt +  β8Unitsi + 
 β9Subsidyijt + β10Rent_to_Incomeij +  β11Vacancy_Rateij+  
 β12Income_to_Povertyij + εijt                                                                        
The dependent variable, LIHTC price, is the capital contribution made to the housing 
project divided by the number of federal LIHTCs generated by the underlying real estate. To 
eliminate variation in my LIHTC price measure due to other tax incentives generated by the 
underlying real estate, I eliminate 379 (i.e., 7 percent) observations that report federal and 
state historic tax credits, or state LIHTCs. After_Tax equals one if the sponsor is purchasing 
LIHTCs for investors demanding guarantees. Proprietary equals one if the sponsor is 
purchasing LIHTCs for the proprietary distribution channel. I include Proprietary, which 
effectively serves as an interaction between the intercept and Proprietary to control for the 
increased value attributed to LIHTCs by these investors because of their ability to satisfy 
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regulatory mandates. Regarding the hypothesized premium on after-tax credits under H1, the 
coefficients of interest are β2 and β3. Specifically, I test the null hypothesis that β2 = 0 and β2 
+ β3 = 0 against the alternate hypothesis that β2 > 0 and β2 + β3 > 0. Consistent with H1, I 
expect to reject the null hypothesis that β2 = 0, however, I do not expect to reject the null 
hypothesis that β2 + β3 = 0. 
 Specification of the control variables considers differences in the perceived risk of 
foreclosure on the underlying real estate generating the tax credits. Region, Location and 
Units are consistent with prior research examining risk differences across LIHTC projects 
(Cummings and DiPasquale 1999). Region considers risk differences among the West, 
Midwest, South, and Northeast regions of the United States, as defined by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. I expect a negative (positive) coefficient on Midwest (West and Northeast). Midwest 
markets tend to have tax credit rents at par with market rents, making these units less 
competitive than other parts of the United States (Tax Credit Advisor, February 2001, p.1.). 
Location considers risk differences among projects located in Rural, Suburban, and Urban 
markets. I expect a positive coefficient on Suburban relative to rural projects because 
suburban areas have a larger tenant set and demand for housing is not as vulnerable to 
changes in local labor markets. I do not make a prediction for Urban because while these 
projects do have a larger possible tenant set, they have also suffered from negative 
perceptions of inner city living (i.e., drugs, crime, etc.). The variable Units is equal to the 
number of rental units, and controls for project size. I expect LIHTC to increase in project 
size because smaller multifamily properties traditionally are more expensive to operate and 
manage for their size compared to larger properties (TCA 2001).  
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 Financing is the type of permanent financing on the housing project – Conventional, 
Tax_Exempt, Soft_Only, RD (rural development loans), and Other. I expect a negative 
coefficient on Tax_Exempt because these projects have more leverage and therefore more 
debt service.15 I expect a positive coefficient on Soft_Only. Soft debt is less risky because the 
debt payments come from project cash flows rather than following a mandatory payment 
schedule. Therefore, if a LIH project with soft debt in its financing structure is experiencing 
negative cash flows, debt service is not required. A LIH project with a significant amount of 
soft debt has a substantially reduced probability of going into foreclosure. I do not make a 
prediction for RD loans or Other. 
 Tenant considers the tenant base served by the housing project – Family, Seniors, 
Mixed (seniors and families), Special Needs, or Other (serving a wide variety of tenant 
groups). I expect a negative coefficient on Family because investors have generally assumed 
seniors projects to be a safer investment than family projects. The perception is the families 
are more mobile than seniors making it more difficult to keep these project units occupied 
(TCA 2001). I do not make predictions for Mixed, Special Needs, or Other. I include Subsidy 
that equals one if the LIH project receives a subsidy such as Section 8 or AAC/Section 9. 
These subsidies have the effect of insuring either a high occupancy or increased cash flow 
available for operating costs, making these projects appealing to LIHTC investors. I expect a 
positive coefficient on Subsidy. 
 Finally, I include three variables constructed from 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data to 
control for the cross-sectional variations in rental market conditions in each 5 digit zip code 
area. I match LIH projects with local market characteristics from the census data at the 5-
                                                 
15 The government allocates fewer LIHTCs to projects with tax-exempt financing, because they already receive 
a federal subsidy in the form of tax-exempt financing. Without as many tax credits to sell to raise equity capital, 
these projects have more leverage.  
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digit zip code level to construct the following: Income_to_Poverty16, Vacancy_Rate, and 
Rent_to_Income. Income_to_Poverty is the percentage of people within that local market 
whose ratio of income to poverty level is below 1.25. I expect a positive coefficient on 
Income_to_Poverty because there should be sufficient demand for affordable housing in 
markets more densely populated by low-income people. Vacancy_Rate is the rental vacancy 
rate for market rate units. I expect a negative coefficient on Vacancy_Rate because a high 
rental vacancy rate indicates a soft overall rental market in that local area. Rent_to_Income is 
a ratio measure of the median contract rent to median gross income. I expect a positive 
coefficient on Rent_to_Income because a higher ratio suggests market rate rental housing in 
less affordable relative to wages in the local market. Lower affordability of market rate 
apartments suggests the local market should exhibit higher demand for affordable housing. 
3.2  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 There is no publicly available source for the market price of LIHTCs. The Affordable 
Housing Services Group of Ernst & Young LLP (E&Y) collects data annually through a 
survey of sponsors and provided access to this confidential database. These data represent 
approximately two-thirds of all wholesale market transactions occurring between sponsors 
and developers since 1986. 
  Table 1, Panel A describes the sample selection process. Of the total 13,503 
transactions represented in these data, I eliminate 4,934 transactions occurring before 1994 
because the FASB began the comment period for what is now EITF 94-1. I further eliminate 
1,526 transactions not occurring between developers and corporate sponsors. These 
transactions are eliminated because individuals are unaffected by financial reporting rules 
                                                 
16 Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) use a similar measure. 
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and sponsors do not provide guarantees to individuals.17 I also eliminate 379 transactions that 
generate tax credits other than federal LIHTCs. Finally, I eliminate 1,407 transactions from 
the sample due to missing data. The final sample consists of 5,257 tax credit transactions 
occurring between developers and sponsors selling LIHTCs to corporate investors.       
 Table 1, Panel B depicts the sample using a bivariate tabular analysis that summarizes 
the intersection of the four distribution channels: pre-tax versus after-tax, and multi-investor 
versus proprietary. Twenty-two percent of all LIHTCs in this sample end up in the 
proprietary distribution channel. Eight (twenty) percent of all transactions in the proprietary 
(multi-investor) channel are after-tax. By comparing observed and expected values in each 
cell, I calculate a χ 2 of 83.12, which exceeds the χ 2 value (10.83) for one degree of freedom 
and p = 0.001. Thus, the data illustrate a statistically significant “bias” towards a higher 
frequency of demand for guarantees coming from the multi-investor distribution channel.  
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. In 
panel A, the mean LIHTC price (i.e., dependent variable) increased over time from 55 cents 
in 1994 to 83 cents in 2005. This increase in price is due primarily to i) increased demand for 
tax credits from corporations coupled with an inelastic supply of tax credits, and ii) a general 
decline in interest rates over my sample period (i.e., as corporations demand a lower yield on 
their investments, sponsors can pay more for tax credits). I attribute the magnitude of the 
variance in LIHTC price to the fact that sponsors compete for tax credits on dimensions other 
than price, or capital contributions (i.e., they may offer side payments, higher fees, etc.). 
Therefore, a developer might receive 45 cents per tax credit from one sponsor and 60 cents 
from another, however, both offers may be attractive once the developer considers other 
                                                 
17 Note a lack of demand for guarantees by individuals supports the notion that corporate demand for guarantees 
is largely accounting-based. 
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aspects of the bid for the LIHTCs. I include sponsor fixed effects in all estimation equations 
to control for heterogeneity across sponsors with respect to the strategy they employ to 
compete for tax credits. Overall, the variance on LIHTC price decreases over time, also 
consistent with increased competition.  
 Table 2, Panel B illustrates statistically significant differences between pre-tax and 
after-tax investments along several dimensions. The largest differences in terms of magnitude 
are the use of tax-exempt financing, urban locations, and tax credit units. Specifically, after-
tax credits have higher incidences of tax-exempt financing and urban locations, as well as 
offer more tax credit units. These factors are likely to be related because housing projects 
using tax-exempt bond financing are typically larger (to cover the bond issuance costs), and 
therefore work well in large urban areas. Table 2, Panel C also shows statistically significant 
differences between multi-investor and proprietary distribution channels. The differences 
along the region dimension in both Panel B and Panel C may relate to the relation between a 
sponsor’s geographic preferences and the mix of their product offerings (i.e., use of the four 
distribution channels).  
3.3 Empirical results 
 Table 3 reports summary statistics from the LIHTC price regression. I report Huber-
White robust standard errors (Rogers 1993, generalizing White 1980) that provide 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics by correcting for dependence within a cluster of related 
observations.18 The results support H1. The coefficient on After_Tax is positive and 
significant at .098 and the coefficient on, Proprietary*After_Tax, is negative and significant 
                                                 
18 See Petersen (2005) for a discussion of clustered standard errors. 
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at -.097. An F-test fails to reject that β2 + β3 = 0, suggesting that sponsors pay more for after-
tax credits only in the multi-investor end-user distribution channel.19  
 The coefficient on After_Tax of .098 means that sponsors bid 10 cents more per dollar 
of tax credit, on average, when they are purchasing LIHTCs from developers for multi-
investor end-users demanding guarantees. This result suggests that 10 cents is the lower 
bound on the accounting premium that sponsors earn by providing guarantees to these 
corporate investors. Section 4 provides some economic intuition behind this result.   
 The explanatory power of the control variables is relatively weak.20 However, one 
could argue that specification of the control variables is potentially trivial, since the 
foreclosure rate is .01 percent. Overall, the results suggest that end-user characteristics and 
the demand for guarantees have a larger affect on LIHTC pricing than project characteristics 
or local market conditions. 
 It is interesting to note the two statistically significant financing coefficients, Tax-
Exempt and Soft-Only. Soft-only debt, by definition, effectively eliminates the risk of 
foreclosure and therefore, a positive coefficient of .0360 on Soft-Only is reassuring. Projects 
with tax-exempt financing use approximately twice as much debt as other projects, so that 
finding that these projects are associated with higher LIHTC prices (i.e., a coefficient of 
.0254), on average, is surprising. I examine this issue further in Section 5 of the paper.  
 
                                                 
 
19 As a comparison, I estimated the equation without considering the multi-investor versus proprietary 
distribution channel. The coefficient on After_Tax was lower in magnitude, .0464, and was only marginally 
significant (i.e., at the 10 percent level). 
 
20 The statistical significance of the control variables in the Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) study that 
estimated a regression of LIHTC yield on project characteristics is also weak. The authors express, for example, 
that “the results on location are somewhat surprising, given that we would expect location to be an important 
determinant of risk (p. 296).” The R-sq in their regression is .23. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PREMIUM ON AFTER-TAX CREDITS 
4.1  How big is a 10-cent premium? 
 I examine the magnitude of this premium in two ways. First, I determine the portion 
of the total guarantee fee paid (i.e., premium on after-tax credits) in the retail market that this 
10-cent premium represents. I expect that corporate investors pay more than 10 cents for 
guarantees in the retail market, because sponsors are not likely to pass the entire guarantee 
fee along to the developer. Second, I examine the relation between LIHTC price and LIHTC 
yield, and examine the yield spread between pre-tax and after-tax credits.  
 Before conducting either analysis, I need to demonstrate the relation between LIHTC 
price and LIHTC yield. Suppose the price of a LIHTC is 80 cents. This translates into the 
corporation receiving 10 cents each year for the next 10 years (i.e., $1 of tax credit realized 
pro-rata over 10 years). Recall investors can also take annual tax deductions for the cost of 
the credit allowing them to realize additional cash flow each year. Assume that, on average, 
these deductions are taken on a straight-line basis over 10 years producing cash flow per year 
of 2.8 cents [(80/10)*.35]. An immediate cash outflow of 80 cents and a cash inflow of 12.8 
cents each year for the next 10 years equates to an internal rate of return of 9.6 percent.21 
 Using the methodology above, I take the results from Table 3, and calculate the 
average price (yield) for pre-tax credits as 71 cents (11.8 percent). The average price (yield) 
for after-tax credits is 81 cents (9.4 percent). These rates of return may seem high, 
                                                 
21 Note this is an after-tax yield because revenue in the form of tax benefits is effectively tax-exempt. 
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particularly since they are after-tax returns. However, recall that the data used in this study 
represent wholesale market transactions between sponsors and developers. Sponsors charge a 
fee and then resell them to corporate investors for a higher price (lower yield).  
 To estimate the premium on after-tax credits in the retail market, I collect 193 yields 
from retail market transactions negotiated between corporate investors and sponsors from 
1994 through 2005. Table 4 reports these results. Again using the methodology above, I 
convert these yields in LIHTC prices. The average price (yield) for pre-tax credits is 99 cents 
(6.1 percent), while the average price (yield) for after-tax credits is 83 cents (9.0 percent). 
 I estimate sponsor fees at 12 cents per LIHTC as the difference in the pre-tax credit 
price in the wholesale market relative to the retail market. The difference in after-tax credit 
price in the wholesale market relative to the retail market, less sponsor fees of 12 cents, 
equals 6 cents. The 6 cents represents the portion of the guarantee fee that sponsors retain, on 
average, for providing guarantees.  
 Collectively, Table 4 illustrates two important points about the magnitude of the 10-
cent premium on after-tax credits. First, corporations demanding guarantees are willing to 
pay, on average, 16 cents (i.e., 99-83) for the guarantee, while sponsors are willing to pay, on 
average, 10 cents more to developers when purchasing LIHTCs for corporations demanding 
guarantees.22 This suggests that at least 60 percent (10/16) of the value attributed to 
guarantees by corporate investors is for accounting benefits. Additionally, by thinking of 
LIHTC price in terms of yield, we can see that the market price of LIHTCs provides 
investors in pre-tax credits a risk premium of 2.9 percent after tax, which equates to a 4.5 
percent (.029/.65) risk premium before tax. This risk premium is large given a foreclosure 
                                                 
22 Guthlein and Bingham (2001) estimate guarantee fees in the range of 15 to 20 percent. My estimate of 16 
percent [16/99] is in line with theirs. 
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rate of .01 percent annually, further supporting the notion that guarantees derive significant 
value from the perceived accounting benefits they provide to investors. See Figure 1b for a 
diagram of these results. 
4.2  Implied risk premium in the market for LIHTCs 
 The results above suggest that guarantees derive at least 60 percent of their value 
from the benefits associated with after-tax accounting. Do guarantees derive the other 40 
percent of their value from risk reduction, or do sponsors profit almost entirely from the 6-
cent portion of the total fee that they retain? With an annual foreclosure rate of .01 percent it 
is reasonable to expect that there is little to no cost to providing a guarantee. However, it also 
possible that an annual foreclosure rate of .01 percent is not an accurate risk measure to use 
in determining the cost of providing the guarantee. 
  Based on discussions with advisors, another risk that a LIHTC investor potentially 
faces is the need for additional capital contributions. Additional capital contributions by the 
investor may be required in cases where the LIH project is experiencing operating deficits 
(i.e., negative cash flow) not funded through standard industry capital reserves, mortgage 
workouts or deferred fees. Under some circumstances, contributing additional capital may be 
less costly than losing the LIH project to foreclosure. While anecdotal evidence suggests 
corporate investors rarely contribute additional capital, no empirical evidence exists to 
support this conjecture. 
 Despite a low foreclosure rate for LIH projects, the data suggest that some projects do 
experience operating deficits. The database used in this study reveals that in 2003, 13 percent 
of the LIH projects in my sample incurred operating deficits (i.e., negative cash flow) that 
were funded through capital reserves, mortgage loan workouts, deferred fees, or ‘other’. 
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Other could include additional investor capital contributions.23 ‘Other’ funded 50 percent of 
these operating deficits with a mean funded deficit in 2003 of $48,496. Compared to the 
mean capital contribution (i.e. the numerator in tax credit price) for this sub-sample of 
projects of $2,199,306, this deficit may appear small. However, if an investor was required to 
fund operating deficits in multiple years over the life of the investment, this could be as 
costly as foreclosure on the LIH project.  
 To obtain an idea of what the yield spread between pre-tax and after-tax LIHTCs 
might look like based on mortgage default rates rather than foreclosure rates, I turn to the 
commercial mortgage backed securities market (CMBS).24 CMBS bonds are publicly traded 
mortgage loan pools collateralized by various types of real estate, including multifamily 
apartment projects. LIH projects are a unique sector of the multifamily apartment market. 
CMBS data do not specifically reflect LIH projects. However, these data do reflect 
multifamily apartments in general and, therefore, can shed light on the appropriateness of the 
observed risk premium in the market for tax credits. 
 Fitch data on CMBS loan defaults from 1993 through 2003 show a cumulative CMBS 
loan default rate of 4.0 percent. The general perception of multifamily loans in the CMBS 
market is that they are safer than other types of real estate, such as office building and hotels. 
Consistent with this perception, the data show that the cumulative default rate on multifamily 
mortgage loans over the same period is 2.6 percent. In 2003, the CMBS market (i.e., with a 
cumulative default rate of 4.0 percent) offered investors a pre-tax yield spread of 0.8 percent 
                                                 
23 When I asked E&Y for a definition of ‘other’, they provided several options. One included the possibility of 
additional investor capital contributions, however, I was told that this is exceedingly rare based on their 
experience.  
 
24 An operating deficit can lead to a mortgage default if not cured within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, 
default risk is a reasonable way to think about operating deficits. 
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(i.e., AAA rating) to 2.1 percent (i.e., BBB- rating) above 10-year Treasuries, (i.e., a 
comparable proxy for guaranteed LIHTCs). (Credit Suisse First Boston, CMBS Market 
Watch Weekly, August 8, 2003). The pre-tax yield spread on LIHTCs in 2003 was 2.9 
percent.  
  A risk premium of 2.9 percent in tax credit markets would imply that unguaranteed 
LIHTC investments are riskier than the lowest investment-grade tranche of a mortgage-
backed security (i.e., BBB-). If 60 percent of the LIHTC spread (i.e., observed in the retail 
market) is attributable to accounting benefits, the remaining risk premium is still 1.8 percent 
[.029*.60]. Even the remaining spread appears high for at least three reasons, supporting the 
notion that a portion of the 6 cents retained by the sponsors represents accounting payments.  
 First, the CMBS spread of 0.8 percent to 2.1 percent considers pools of loans 
collateralized by all property types, including hotels which are considered far more risky than 
apartments. Assuming the entire loan pool was populated with multifamily loans (i.e., with a 
default rate of 2.6 percent rather then 4.0 percent), the pre-tax yield spread on CMBS might 
be more in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.4 percent.25 This range is lower than the 1.8 percent 
(i.e., sponsors compensation) in the market for LIHTCs. 
 Second, LIH projects are a very specific sector of the apartment market offering 
below market rents. For this reason, LIH projects are insulated from natural fluctuations in 
real estate relative to market-rate apartments. Mortgages on market-rate apartments act as 
collateral on CMBS pools, not LIH apartments. After considering the unique nature of LIH, 
the risk of defaults or operating deficits in LIH are likely to be even lower than implied by 
the yield spread in CMBS markets.  
                                                 
25 The default rate on multifamily loans is 35 percent lower than total loans [(.04-.026/.04]. Therefore, I take the 
endpoints of the yield spread and multiply them by .65 to estimate the CMBS spread using the lower default 
rate observed in multifamily loans. 
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 Finally, the CMBS market directly links mortgage defaults and risk premiums. The 
reasons for this is bond payments in the CMBS market depend directly upon the principal 
and interest payments received from the underlying mortgage loans. Defaults in the LIHTC 
market are resolved in a number of different ways that may or may not include additional 
investor capital contributions. Therefore, the investor is not necessarily at risk in the case of a 
mortgage default because there are a number of safety nets built into the syndication process 
(i.e., the buying and selling of tax credits).  
 In summary, I conclude the value of a guarantee attributable to accounting benefits is 
somewhere between 10 cents and 16 cents. Investors appear willing to pay, on average, 16 
cents per LIHTC for a guarantee. Ten cents goes towards the development of affordable 
housing when sponsors bid more, and 6 cents stays with the sponsor, partially for 
compensation and partially as accounting profit. On average, the lower bound on the value of 
a guaranteed attributable to accounting benefits is 10 cents (or 60 percent), while the upper 
bound is 16 cents (with a low foreclosure rate, it is possible that there is little to no cost in 
providing a guarantee). While it is difficult to estimate how much of 6 cents represent 
accounting profit, sponsors do appear to earn profits from accounting-based demand for 
guarantees as evidenced by their compensation exceeding risk premiums seen in the CMBS 
market.  
4.3 Exchange rate between pre-tax and after-tax earnings 
 If corporations are willing to pay 16 cents for the guarantee, yet the cost of the 
guarantee is at most 6 cents, the 10-cent premium implies a willingness by managers to incur 
real costs to qualify for after-tax accounting. Recall that pre-tax accounting reduces pre-tax 
earnings by the cost of the credit and after-tax accounting has no effect on pre-tax earnings. 
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If the average cost of a pre-tax credit in the retail market is 83 cents, the average reduction to 
pre-tax earnings for pre-tax credit investors is 83 cents. If investors pay 10 cents for the 
accounting benefits associated with after-tax credits, they avoid a reduction to pre-tax 
earnings of 83 cents.   
 Given the relation between tax credit price and pre-tax earnings charges, I can 
estimate an exchange rate between pre-tax and after-tax earnings. A 10-cent premium 
provides the investor with an additional tax benefit of 3.5 cents [10*.35] additional premium 
provides and additional tax deduction. Therefore, investors reduce after-tax earnings by 6.5 
cents [10-3.5] to avoid a reduction to pre-tax earnings of 83 cents. In terms of dollars, this 
means that some tax credit investors sacrifice $1 of after-tax earnings to increase pre-tax 
earnings by approximately $13 [83/6.5], on average.  
4.4  The market price of guarantees 
 An economic question arises from the results of this analysis. How can a sponsor earn 
a guarantee fee of 16 cents per LIHTC, on average, in a market setting where the price of the 
guarantee should be at most 6 cents? There is a vast body of research in industrial 
organization on the influence of industry structure on profitability (see Scherer, F.M., 1980 
for a survey of this literature). According to this literature, one of the key determinants of the 
market price of a good or service is the degree to which there is competition among suppliers 
of the same or similar products. Relying on this research, organizational strategy literature 
suggests a framework for thinking about the intensity of competition, and the potential for 
creating abnormal profits by the firms in an industry (Porter, M. E., 1980) 
 Using this framework, I discuss four factors that create conditions under which the 
market price of guarantees makes sense. First, competition in the market for guarantees is 
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monopolistic competition, where firms are competing but each firm’s products are slightly 
different. The overall effect of product differentiation is that it lessens price competition. If a 
sponsor were to lower the price of their guarantee on the LIHTC, corporations are not likely 
to switch sponsors based on the price of a guarantee. Therefore, this strategy would not 
necessarily have the effect of increasing demand for guarantees from that sponsor. The 
reason for this is that sponsors provide asset management, compliance, and reporting 
services, something that is important to corporations (i.e., I estimate the fee for these services 
at 12 cents per LIHTC). Sponsors sell “guaranteed tax credits” not guarantees by themselves, 
so the product differentiation comes from the intermediary services for the underlying tax 
credit investment and sponsor reputation. The propensity to switch sponsors purely based on 
price of the guarantee is low, because corporations would also be switching the provider of 
the intermediary services. 
 Second, even if lowering the price of a guarantee did increase demand for the 
sponsor’s guarantees, it is difficult for the sponsor to supply the guarantees because he 
generally must use a third party with a strong rating in order to offer the guarantee. Based on 
discussions with sponsors, negotiations between sponsors and guarantors often break down 
because they cannot agree on a fee-sharing arrangement that is agreeable to both parties. 
Because offering the guarantee introduces complex profit and risk-sharing issues, a sponsor 
may not be able to meet increased demand resulting from a reduction in price. Sponsors are 
“continually searching for new guarantors to create additional guaranteed investments to 
meet the demand” (Bingham and Guthlein 2001). Because the market demand for LIHTCs, 
both pre-tax and after-tax, generally exceeds supply, the industry does not have excess 
capacity issues and there is no incentive to cut prices to fill capacity. 
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 A third factor that determines the intensity of competition in the market for 
guarantees is the threat of new entrants. Because these monopolistically competitive firms 
appear to earn attractive profit margins, the next question is why the profits on guarantees do 
not attract new entrants to the industry. There are a number of barriers to entry in the market 
for LIHTCs including brand recognition, relationships with and access to developers (i.e., 
suppliers of LIHTCs), and extensive knowledge of Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code 
which governs the LIHTC program. Firms cannot simply enter the market and earn profits by 
providing guarantees, because they must work with a sponsor selling the underlying tax 
credit guaranteed. Again, this leads back to complex profit-sharing issues.  
 The final factor driving the market price of guarantees is that the relative bargaining 
power of corporations relative to sponsors is low. Relative bargaining power depends on the 
cost to each party of not doing business with the other. There are few alternative products 
available to corporations to obtain guarantees, lessening their bargaining power. There is 
anecdotal evidence that corporations can obtain guarantees through a secondary market, as 
opposed to primary market guarantees purchased through sponsors. For example, some 
corporate investors, with high and stable debt ratings, purchase unguaranteed LIHTCs and 
resell them to other corporate investors with a guarantee, presumably for a lower price than 
that demanded by a sponsor. However, the supply of secondary market guarantees is not 
likely to pose a major threat to primary market guarantees. The reason is that “guarantee 
demand, combined with rising guarantee fees and the lack of supply in the guarantee market 
(e.g., reduction in volume by some guarantors, and exit by others due to credit problems and 
ownership changes), bodes well for those interested in guaranteeing affordable housing 
investment” (Bingham and Guthlein 2001). 
  
CHAPTER 5 
RELATION BETWEEN LIHTC PRICE AND PROJECT FINANCING 
 In this section, I explore further the earlier finding that higher LIHTC prices are 
associated with projects that use tax-exempt financing, even though these projects have more 
leverage.  Recall from Section 2.1 that total tax deductions from operating losses reflected in 
pre-tax earnings over the life of the investment are equal to the amount of equity capital 
contributed. The use of tax-exempt financing has the effect of accelerating the timing of 
these tax deductions. The increased cash flow from accelerated tax deductions presents 
investors in pre-tax and after-tax LIHTCs with a different trade-off between cash and 
earnings. Therefore, examining the relation between LIHTC price, project financing, and 
accounting sheds light on investor heterogeneity in the coordination of cash flow and 
accounting earnings when making tax advantaged investments.  
 To frame the following discussion, the reader can think of LIHTC investments as 
investments in fixed assets. Investors record an asset on the balance sheet, and depreciation 
reduces both financial accounting and taxable income over the asset’s useful life. Accelerated 
depreciation for both book and tax would provide the investor with a higher present value 
cash flow (from tax savings) but a lower present value of financial accounting earnings. 
Thus, accelerated depreciation has the effect of presenting the manager with a tradeoff. 
Numerous studies have examined this tradeoff (see Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a 
summary of this literature). The contribution of this analysis to prior research is that this 
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setting allows me to examine how investor heterogeneity in the coordination of cash flow and 
accounting earnings, in tax planning, changes when the tradeoff changes.  
 Think of projects that use tax-exempt financing as fixed assets that use accelerated 
depreciation for tax purposes (but not necessarily for financial accounting), relative to 
projects that use other types of financing. To explore investor heterogeneity, I examine 
whether the coefficient on Tax-Exempt varies between Pre_Tax and After_Tax. I expect the 
coefficient on Tax-Exempt to differ because the financial reporting tradeoffs are different 
depending on the accounting method used. For ease of exposition, I refer to pre-tax 
accounting using other (tax-exempt) financing as PTL (PTH), consistent with the investor 
receiving a relatively lower (higher) present value tax savings. I refer to after-tax accounting 
using other (tax-exempt) financing as ATL (ATH), also consistent with the investor receiving 
a relatively lower (higher) present value tax savings. I refer the reader to Figure 2 to illustrate 
the following points. Figure 2 draws on the previous example (i.e., an investor purchases 100 
LIHTCs for $80) and illustrates annual effects on the income statement for each combination 
of accounting method and financing type. This example intends to illustrate the relative 
differences among PTL, PTH, ATL and ATH investments. 
 The PTH investment, relative to the PTL investment, introduces the tradeoff between 
tax savings and accounting earnings. There are thee important things to note when comparing 
the PTH with the PTL investment. First, by recognizing the LIHTC losses earlier in the 
investment’s life, the PTH investor increases the present value of his tax savings from the tax 
deductions. Second, the PTH investor decreases the present value of his financial accounting 
earnings because under pre-tax accounting, financial accounting income and taxable income 
are both calculated using accelerated depreciation (i.e., book and taxable income are said to 
   32
“conform”). Third, he induces volatility in his ETR, because each year a different proportion 
of his tax benefits come from tax deductions versus tax credits. Therefore, investors in PTH 
must accept i) a lower present value of accounting earnings, and ii) ETR volatility in order to 
value the accelerated tax savings relative to PTL credits. 
 The ATH investment relative to the ATL investment effectively eliminates this 
tradeoff in three ways. First, by reporting the tax deductions in tax expense, pre-tax earnings 
are unaffected by tax deductions. Thus, pre-tax earnings are the same each year for ATH and 
ATL investments. Second, after-tax earnings are also the same each year for ATH and ATL 
investments. The result occurs because accounting income and taxable income do not 
conform under after-tax accounting, as they do in pre-tax accounting. Instead, the investor is 
able to use accelerated depreciation in calculating taxable income, while depreciation for 
accounting income remains straight-line (i.e. $8 each year).26 Third, the investor eliminates 
his ETR volatility. By depreciating the LIHTC investment at a different rate for book and 
tax, the investor enjoys a timing difference, reflected in deferred taxes until the end of the 
investment’s life. Changing the portion of total tax expense that is current versus deferred 
does not change the accounting ETR each year. In other words, the ATH investor can realize 
a higher present value cash flow without the tradeoff that the PTH investor faces. 
  There is also anecdotal evidence to support the notion that these different tradeoffs 
may affect the price of LIHTCs. For example, Paul Richman, a housing fund sponsor stated, 
“Due to the book income problems associated with [LIHTCs from projects using tax-exempt 
financing], the market is currently experiencing a shortage of investors in these tax credits.” 
                                                 
26 EITF 94-1 imposes a different amortization process for writing the asset off the balance sheet. Operating 
losses generated by the housing project generate financial accounting amortization for the LIHTC investment 
recorded on the balance sheet (i.e., called the equity method of accounting). After-tax accounting generates 
amortization through a process similar to that used for bond amortization (i.e., called the effective yield method 
of accounting), thereby de-linking the amortization from the underlying project performance.  
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Furthermore, another sponsor expressed the notion that the tradeoff changes for investors that 
use after-tax accounting in the following statement, “The guaranteed market appears to have 
become an outlet for selling [LIHTCs from projects using tax-exempt financing]. These 
credits have become an anathema to corporate investors, due to the negative impact their 
higher losses have on earnings. This disincentive falls away when the credits are 
guaranteed.” Tax Credit Advisor, October 2002. 
 From this discussion, I offer the following testable hypothesis, stated in the alternate 
form: 
H2A:  The LIHTC price premium on PTH investments compared with PTL 
investments is lower than the price premium on ATH investments compared 
with ATL investments. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I estimate the regression from Section 3.1 with two modifications. 
First, I include only one indicator variable, Tax_Exempt, which is equal to one (zero) for 
housing projects using tax-exempt financing (all other types of financing). Second, I interact 
the financing indicator variable, Tax_Exempt with After_Tax. I do not predict differences 
across multi-investor and proprietary, however, I distinguish among the distribution channels 
to remain consistent with the prior estimation equation. Specifically, I estimate the following 
equation: 
LIHTC priceijt =  β0 + β1Proprietaryijt + β2After_Taxijt+ β3Proprietary*After_Taxijt +  
 β4Tax_Exemptijt +  β5Proprietary*Tax_Exemptijt +  
                                               β6Tax_Exempt*After_Taxijt + β7Proprietary*Tax_Exempt*After_Taxijt 
+                                                       Controls + εijt                        
 The coefficients of interest are β4 and β6. Specifically, I test the null hypothesis that β6 
- β4 = 0, against the alternative hypothesis that β6 - β4 > 0. Tax_Exempt in this estimation 
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effectively serves as an interaction with Tax_Exempt with Pre_Tax (the intercept). Table 5 
reports the summary statistics. The coefficient on β4 is .0427, which suggests that the average 
LIHTC investor using pre-tax accounting values cash flow more than accounting earnings 
because they are willing to pay a premium to obtain the accelerated tax deductions. The 
coefficient on β6 is .0111, which suggests that the average LIHTC investor using after-tax 
accounting also values the additional tax savings generated by tax-exempt financing. 
However, overall, the results are inconsistent with H2, because β6 - β4 < 0. This result is 
unexpected because investors using after-tax accounting appear to be valuing the additional 
tax benefits less compared with investors using pre-tax accounting even though their 
financial reporting costs are lower. 
 I offer two explanations for this unexpected result. First, the conjecture set forth and 
tested in the main analysis is that investors in after-tax credits purchase guarantees to obtain a 
desired financial statement presentation. This suggests that they focus on the accounting 
earnings impact of the investment, rather than cash flow. While investors that use after-tax 
accounting receive an economic benefit from accelerated tax savings, accounting earnings 
and the ETR do not reflect the additional tax savings (i.e., pre-tax earnings, after-tax 
earnings, and the ETR are the same each year). The failure of the additional tax benefits from 
the timing differences to reflect in accounting earnings might explain the apparent lack of 
value (relative to investors in pre-tax credits) attributed to this benefit. This is consistent with 
anecdotal evidence that corporate tax directors value permanent, rather than temporary, 
differences between accounting earnings and taxable income because temporary differences 
do not lower the accounting ETR (Neubig 2006). 
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 Second, an analysis of the distribution of Tax_Exempt across accounting type 
suggests that supply and demand within each distribution channel may also help to explain 
these results. Table 5, Panel B depicts the sample using a bivariate tabular analysis that 
summarizes the intersection of the accounting treatment and financing type: pre-tax versus 
after-tax, and tax-exempt versus other. Forty-two (eight) percent of all after-tax (pre-tax) 
credits are generated by housing projects using tax-exempt financing. By comparing 
observed and expected values in each cell, I calculate a χ 2 of 794, which exceeds the χ2 value 
(10.83) for one degree of freedom and p < 0.01. Thus, the data illustrate a statistically 
significant “bias” towards a higher frequency of projects using tax-exempt financing being 
sold to investors using after-tax accounting.  
 The overall effect of this distributional bias may be that sponsors do not have to 
compete as heavily for credits from projects using tax-exempt financing when they purchase 
tax credits for the after-tax distribution channel. In other words, sponsors supply just enough 
credits coming from projects that use tax-exempt financing to investors using pre-tax 
accounting (i.e., 43 percent) such that the corporations who value cash flow versus 
accounting earnings pay a premium for them. When sponsors supply the remaining credits 
coming from projects that use tax-exempt financing (i.e., 57 percent) to investors that use 
after-tax accounting there may be no need to pay a premium because supply exceeds demand 
in the overall LIHTC market for these credits. In other words, while there is a 4-cent 
premium on PTH credits relative to PTL credits, the distributional bias might suggest that a 
large number of investors using pre-tax accounting do not value cash flow more than 
accounting earnings.  
  
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 This main contribution of this study is the finding that investors appear willing to pay 
cash for higher pre-tax earnings. This study exploits the market for LIHTCs and GAAP 
accounting for those investments. Specifically, accounting guidance allows LIHTC investors 
to report tax deductions as reductions to pre-tax earnings, or alternatively, as an increase to 
tax expense. The accounting treatment of LIHTCs is therefore a tractable setting in which to 
examine the preference by managers to report higher pre-tax earnings even if after-tax 
earnings are the same. By examining the market price of LIHTCs, I find that higher prices 
are associated with investments that allow the investor to report tax deductions in tax 
expense, thereby avoiding reductions to pre-tax earnings. This suggests that corporations 
place more value on tax incentives when after-tax accounting income increases with no 
reduction to pre-tax earnings.  
 I also examine investor heterogeneity in the coordination of cash flow and earnings 
when making tax-advantaged investments. I provide evidence that the preference for 
investments that generate higher present value tax savings is diverse. Some investors do 
appear willing to pay a premium for LIHTCs to obtain a higher present value cash flow from 
accelerated tax deductions, even when the additional tax deductions lower the present value 
of their accounting earnings. This suggests that some investors value tax incentives for their 
economic benefits, independent of the effect on accounting earnings. I also find evidence that 
some investors pay a relatively lower premium for this additional cash flow, even when the 
   37
additional tax deductions do not lower the present value of their accounting earnings. This 
suggests that some investors focus on how the transaction reflects in accounting earnings. 
They do not value the economic benefits of tax incentives when the additional savings do not 
reflect in accounting earnings.  
 Overall, this study further suggests the need to explore the valuation implications of 
pre-tax and after-tax earnings components. An understanding of how tax reporting effects 
perceptions of performance can lead to a better understanding of how’s firms respond to 
available or proposed tax incentives. This could include studies on how analysts, auditors, 
creditors, etc. use and interpret a firm’s tax planning activities as reflected in the financial 
statements. 
 
   38
REFERENCES 
2004 U.S. CMBS Conduit Loan Default and Loss Study, Fitch Ratings, Commercial 
 Mortgage  Special Report. 
 
Bingham, K.M., and W. Guthlein, 2001. The LIHTC Program and Considerations for 
Guarantors of Affordable Housing Funds, unpublished work. 
 
Bradshaw, M., and R. Sloan, 2002. GAAP versus the street: An empirical assessment of  two 
 alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 41-65. 
 
Cummings, J. L., and D. DiPasquale, 1998. Building affordable rental housing: An analysis 
of the                   low-income housing tax credit. City Research.  
 
Cummings, J. L., and D. DiPasquale, 1999. The low-income housing tax credit: An   analysis 
of the first ten years. Housing Policy Debate, Volume 10, Issue 2. 
 
Davis, A., 2002. The value relevance of revenue for internet firms: Does reporting  grossed-
up or  barter revenue make a difference? Journal of Accounting Research 40:  445-477. 
 
Engel, E., M. Erickson and E. Maydew, 1999. Debt-equity hybrid securities. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 37: 249-74. 
 
Ernst & Young, “Understanding the dynamics: A comprehensive look at  affordable  housing 
tax  credit properties,” 2002. 
 
Ernst & Young, “Understanding the dynamics II: A comprehensive look at  affordable 
 housing tax  credit properties,” 2004. 
 
Ernst & Young, “Understanding the dynamics III: A comprehensive look at  affordable 
 housing  tax credit properties,” 2005. 
 
EITF 94-1, Accounting for Tax Benefits from Investments in Affordable Housing  Projects.  
 
Fairfield, P., Sweeney, R., and Yohn, T., 1996. Accounting classification and the  predictive 
 content of earnings. The Accounting Review 71: 337-355. 
 
Francis, J., K. Schipper, L. Vincent, 2003. The relative and incremental explanatory power of 
 earning and alternative (to earnings) performance measures for returns. Contemporary 
 Accounting Research, Spring 2003: 20, 1, 121-164. 
 
Gleason, C., and L. Mills, 2006. Evidence of differing market responses to meeting or 
beating   targets through tax expense management. University of Iowa and University of 
Texas at Austin working paper. 
 
   39
Guenther, D., and D. Jones, 2006. Valuation implications of changes in firms’ effective tax 
rates. University of Oregon and College of William and Mary working paper. 
 
Guenther, D., E. Maydew, S. Nutter, 1997. Financial Reporting, Tax Costs, and Book-Tax   
 Conformity. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, 225-248. 
 
Lev, B. and S. Thiagarajan, 1993. Fundamental information analysis. Journal of Accounting 
Research 31, 190-215.  
 
Lipe, R. C., 1986. The information contained in the components of earnings. Journal of 
 Accounting Research 24, 37-64. 
 
McVay, S.E., 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination  of 
core  earnings and special items. The Accounting Review 81, 3, 501-531. 
 
Neubig, T., “Where’s the Applause? Why Most Corporations Prefer a Lower Corporate Tax 
Rate to Expensing,” Tax Notes, May 2006. 
 
“Paramount funds leads active guaranteed market,” Journal of Tax Credit Investing, Summer 
  2003. 
 
Petersen, M. 2005. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
 approaches.  NBER working paper 11280. 
 
Porter, M.E. Competitive Strategy, New York: The Free Press, 1980. 
 
Scherer, F.M., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, second edition, 
Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1980. 
 
Wolfson, M., 1985. Empirical evidence of incentive problems and their mitigation in oil  and 
gas  tax shelter programs. In: Pratt, J., Zeckhauser, R. (Eds.), Principals and  Agents: the 
Structure  of Business. HBS Press, Boston, pp. 101-125. 
 
  
40
GUARANTOR 
CORPORATE 
INVESTOR DEVELOPER 
$1 LIHTC
Cash for LIHTC
Cash for guarantee fee  
(if guaranteed) 
Cash for load
$1 LIHTC
Cash for LIHTC
Risk-sharing agreement X percent of guarantee fee 
*
Accounting 
premium? 
SPONSOR 
RETAIL 
MARKET 
WHOLESALE 
MARKET 
Figure 1 a      Diagram of tax credit market structure
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Figure 1 b      Diagram of tax credit market structure with results from Table 4 
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Figure 2    Sample income statements for intersection of accounting treatment and financing type 
 
 
a Annual and cumulative differences due to rounding 
 
b Tax deductions generated by operating losses on the underlying real estate 
 
c Pre-tax earnings*ETR  OR  Pre-tax earnings*.35 minus 10 from LIHTCs 
 
Pre-tax accounting with other financing a
PTL 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cum. 
Sales 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,000
LIHTC lossesb (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (80) 
Pre-tax earnings 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 920 
            
Current tax expense (benefit)c 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 222 
Deferred tax expense (benefit)d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total tax expense 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 222 
            
After-tax earnings 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 698 
ETRe      .24      .24      .24      .24      .24      .24      .24      .24     .24      .24 .24 
Taxable incomef 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 920 
Pre-tax accounting with tax-exempt financing a 
PTH 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cum. 
Sales 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,000
LIHTC lossesb (16) (14) (12) (10) (8) (6) (4) (4) (4) (2) (80) 
Pre-tax earnings 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 96 96 98 920 
            
Current tax expense (benefit)c 19 20 21 22 22 23 24 24 24 24 222 
Deferred tax expense (benefit)d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total tax expense 19 20 21 22 22 23 24 24 24 24 222 
            
After-tax earnings 65 66 67 69 70 71 72 72 72 74 698 
ETRe .23 .23 .24 .24 .24 .24 .25 .25 .25 .25 .24 
Taxable incomef 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 96 96 98 920 
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d (Pre-tax earnings minus Taxable income)*.35; if > 0 then a deferred tax expense, if < 0 then a deferred tax benefit. 
 
e Total tax expense divided by Pre-tax earnings 
 
f Sales minus LIHTC losses recorded on tax return  
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Figure 2   (cont.) Sample income statements for intersection of accounting treatment and financing type 
 
After-tax accounting with other financing a 
ATL 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cum.  
Sales 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,000 
LIHTC losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pre-tax earnings 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,000 
            
Current tax expense (benefit)b 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 302 
Deferred tax expense (benefit)c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total tax expense 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 302 
            
After-tax earnings 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 698 
ETRd       .30       .30       .30       .30       .30        .30       .30       .30       .30       .30        
.30      
Taxable incomee 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 920 
Pre-tax earnings b4 reclassificationf 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 920 
After-tax accounting with tax-exempt financing a 
ATH 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Cum. 
Sales 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,000 
LIHTC losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pre-tax earnings 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1,000 
            
Current tax expense (benefit)b 27 28 29 30 30 31 32 32 32 32 302 
Deferred tax expense (benefit)c 3 2 1 1 0 (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) 0 
Total tax expense 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 302 
            
After-tax earnings 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 698 
ETRe       .30       .30       .30       .30       .30        .30       .30       .30       .30       .30       .30   
Taxable incomee 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 96 96 98 920 
Pre-tax earnings b4 reclassificationf 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 920 
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a Annual and cumulative differences due to rounding 
 
b 100 *.35 - 10 + (8-3); less deferred taxes if tax-exempt financing 
 
c (Pre-tax earnings before reclassification minus Taxable income)*.35; if > 0 then a deferred tax expense, if < 0 then a deferred tax benefit.  
 
d Total tax expense divided by Pre-tax earnings 
 
e Sales minus LIHTC losses recorded on tax return 
 
f  100 – 8; the same regardless of the type of financing used 
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Table 1 
Sample selection and description 
 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
  
Total LIHTC transactions in dataset                13,503 
(Less) LIHTC transactions before 1994     4,934  
(Less) LIHTCs not for corporate distribution     1,526 
(Less) projects with tax credits other than federal LIHTCs         379 
(Less) incomplete data      1,407 
 
Sample      5,257 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Sample description 
 Intersection of accounting-type and investor-type distribution channels  
 
 Proprietary Multi-Investor Total 
After-tax      92    808    900 
Pre-tax 1,044 3,313 4,357 
Total 1,136 4,121 5,257 
 
Investors purchasing LIHTCs through Proprietary (Multi-investor) distribution channels have relatively more 
(less) transparent disclosure of LIHTC investments in their GAAP financial statements. Investors demanding 
guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the After_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax deductions 
in tax expense as offsets to revenue from the LIHTCs. Investors not demanding guarantees purchase LIHTCs 
through the Pre_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax deductions as reductions to pre-tax 
earnings. 
 
    
  47
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables 
 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable, LIHTC price  a 
Year N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
10th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
1994 239 .55 .13 .45 .69 
1995 338 .60 .13 .50 .78 
1996 359 .60 .11 .52 .73 
1997 415 .65 .12 .55 .80 
1998 439 .72 .13 .60 .89 
1999 490 .76 .11 .67 .89 
2000 537 .79 .11 .70 .88 
2001 528 .80 .10 .71 .88 
2002 489 .81 .09 .75 .89 
2003 574 .81 .09 .74 .88 
2004 523 .81 .08 .76 .87 
2005 326 .83 .07 .78 .89 
Sample 5,257 .73 .10 .64 .84 
 
                
Panel B:     Control variables: Pre-tax versus after-tax a 
 
 
Variable Pre-tax After-tax 
Difference  
in Means  
Region  Midwest     .27        .21 .06  ** 
 Northeast     .20        .07 .12  ** 
 West     .20        .26 -.06 ** 
 South     .33        .46 .12 ** 
Tenant  Family     .74        .76 -.02  
 Mixed     .02        .02 .00   
 Special_Needs     .01        .01 .00   
 Other     .02        .01 .01  ** 
 Senior     .21        .21 -.00  
Financing  Tax-Exempt     .10        .36 -.26 ** 
 Soft_Only     .06        .03 .03  ** 
 RD     .12        .00 .12  ** 
 Other     .22        .02 .19  ** 
 Conventional     .50        .59 -.09 ** 
Location  Urban     .64       .79 -.15 ** 
 Suburban        .19        .14 .05  ** 
 Rural       .13        .03 .10  ** 
 Units 73.63 139.29 -65.66 ** 
 Subsidy     .10        .02 .08  ** 
 Rent_to_Income     .25        .25 .01   
 Vacancy_Rate     .08        .08 .00   
 Income_to_Poverty     .24        .19 .05  ** 
 
  48
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables 
(cont.) 
 
Panel C:    Control variables: Proprietary versus multi-investor a 
 
 
Variable Proprietary Multi-investor
Difference 
in Means  
Region  Midwest .15 .29 -.14 ** 
 Northeast .15 .18 -.04 ** 
 West .25 .20 .06 ** 
 South .45 .33 .12 ** 
Tenant Family .74 .74 .00  
 Mixed .03 .02 .01  
 Special_Needs .01 .01 .00  
 Other .00 .02 -.02 ** 
 Senior .22 .21 .01  
Financing  Tax-Exempt .18 .13 .05 ** 
 Soft_Only .06 .05 .01  
 RD .07 .11 -.05 ** 
 Other .11 .20 -.09 ** 
 Conventional .58 .50 .08 ** 
Location  Urban .67 .67 .00  
 Suburban .20 .18 .02  
 Rural .10 .12 -.02  
 Units 95.17 82.03 13.14 ** 
 Subsidy .09 .09 .01  
 Rent_to_Income .26 .25 .00  
 Vacancy_Rate .09 .09 -.01  
 Income_to_Poverty .23 .14 .10 ** 
 
a LIHTC price is the ratio of the capital contribution to the number of federal LIHTCs purchased. Investors 
purchasing LIHTCs through Proprietary (Multi-investor) distribution channels have relatively more (less) 
transparent disclosure of LIHTC investments in their GAAP financial statements. Investors demanding 
guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the After_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax deductions 
in tax expense as offsets to revenue from the LIHTCs. Investors not demanding guarantees purchase LIHTCs 
through the Pre_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax deductions as reductions to pre-tax 
earnings. Region designates one of four regions of the United States, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Tenant designates one of five tenant types occupying the housing project. Financing designates one of five 
types of permanent financing on the underlying housing project. Location designates one of three location types 
in which the housing project is located based on population density, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Units is the number of rental units offered by the housing project. Subsidy equals one if the housing project 
receives a government subsidy. Rent_to_Income is the ratio of median gross rent to median income in the 5-
digit zip code area in which the housing project is located. Vacancy_Rate is the rental vacancy rate for market 
rate apartments in the 5-digit zip code area in which the housing project is located. Income_to_Poverty is the 
percentage of households that have a ratio of median income to poverty level less than 1.25 in the 5-digit zip 
code area in which the housing project is located. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by sponsor, are in 
parentheses. *, and ** denote significance at five and one percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 3 
 Summary statistics of regression of LIHTC price on distribution channel indicators and 
control variables a 
 
N=5257  
Variable Prediction Coefficient 
H1N 
β2 = 0 
β2 + β3 = 0 p-value 
Intercept +         .7099** 
      (.0441) 
 
Proprietary +          .0321** 
      (.0088) 
 
After_Tax + β2         .0980* 
       (.0422) 
Proprietary*After_Tax - β3       -.0967* 
       (.0396) 
β2 + β3 = 0 
 
< . 91 
Region  Midwest -          .0047 
       (.0078)  
 Northeast +         -.0068 
       (.0152)  
 West +          .0051 
       (.0058)  
Tenant  Family -         -.0064 
       (.0071)  
 Mixed ?         -.0155 
       (.0107)  
 Special_Needs ?         -.0643* 
       (.0237)  
 Other ?           .0067 
       (.0084)  
Financing  Tax-Exempt -          .0254** 
       (.0075)  
 Soft_Only +          .0360** 
       (.0109)  
 RD ?         -.0028 
       (.0125)  
 Other ?         -.0093 
       (.0050)  
Location  Urban ?          .0033 
       (.0061)  
 Suburban +          .0019 
       (.0048)  
 Units +         -.000019 
       (.000033)  
 Subsidy +         -.0043 
       (.0081)  
 Rent_to_Income +         -.0186 
       (.0466)  
 Vacancy_Rate -          .0115 
       (.0199)  
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 Income_to_Poverty +         -.0387 
       (.0253)  
 R-Square         .4830  
 
a LIHTC price is the ratio of the capital contribution to the number of federal LIHTCs purchased. Investors 
purchasing LIHTCs through Proprietary (Multi-investor) distribution channels have relatively more (less) 
transparent disclosure of LIHTC investments in their GAAP financial statements. Investors demanding 
guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the After_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax 
deductions in tax expense as offsets to revenue from the LIHTCs. Investors not demanding guarantees 
purchase LIHTCs through the Pre_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax deductions as 
reductions to pre-tax earnings. Region designates one of four regions of the United States, as defined by the 
U.S. Census Bureau. Tenant designates one of five tenant types occupying the housing project. Financing 
designates one of five types of permanent financing on the underlying housing project. Location designates 
one of three location types in which the housing project is located based on population density, as defined 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. Units is the number of rental units offered by the housing project. Subsidy 
equals one if the housing project receives a government subsidy. Rent_to_Income is the ratio of median 
gross rent to median income in the 5-digit zip code area in which the housing project is located. 
Vacancy_Rate is the rental vacancy rate for market rate apartments in the 5-digit zip code area in which the 
housing project is located. Income_to_Poverty is the percentage of households that have a ratio of median 
income to poverty level less than 1.25 in the 5-digit zip code area in which the housing project is located. 
Huber-White standard errors, clustered by sponsor, are in parentheses. *, and ** denote significance at five 
and one percent levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 4 
Economic significance of premium on after-tax creditsa 
 
Multi-Investor  
Retail  
Market 
Sponsor  
Compensation 
Multi-Investor 
Wholesale 
Market 
Sample Period: 
1994-2005 
N Mean Yield 
Mean 
Price Load Guarantee 
Mean  
Price 
(From Table 3) 
After_Tax  47 .061   .99 .12 .06 .81 
Pre_Tax  146 .090   .83 .12 n/a .71 
 
Total guarantee fee paid 
by corporate investor  .029*   .16* 
     Sponsor’s share  .06 
     Developer’s share  .10 
63 percent  
of total guarantee fee [10/16]  
is lower bound on value  
derived from accounting benefits 
 
a Investors demanding guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the After_Tax distribution channel, where 
investors report tax deductions in tax expense as offsets to revenue from the LIHTCs. Investors not 
demanding guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the Pre_Tax distribution channel, where investors report 
tax deductions as reductions to pre-tax earnings. Retail Market transactions occur between corporations and 
sponsors. Wholesale Market transactions occur between sponsors and developers. *, and ** denote 
significance at five and one percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Test of effect of cash flow versus book earnings on LIHTC price a 
 
Panel A:  Summary statistics 
 Dependent variable is LIHTC price 
 
N=5257  
Variable 
 
Coefficient Prediction 
H2N 
β 6 - β 4 = 0 p-value 
Intercept PTL  +          .7076** 
 (.0456) 
 
Proprietary   +           .0363** 
  (.0107) 
 
After_Tax ATL  +       .1049* 
 (.0459) 
 
Proprietary*After_Tax   -    -.0817* 
  (.0399) 
 
Tax_Exempt 
 
PTH β 4 +           .0427** 
  (.0131) 
Proprietary*Tax_Exempt 
 
  ?   -.0242 
   (.0125) 
Tax_Exempt*After_Tax 
 
ATH β 6 +  .0111** 
   (.0037) 
β 6 - β 4 = 0 
 
< . 01 
Proprietary*Tax_Exempt* 
After_Tax 
  ?    -.0341* 
  (.0133) 
 
R-Square      .4830  
 
a  LIHTC price is the ratio of the capital contribution to the number of federal LIHTCs purchased. Investors 
purchasing LIHTCs through Proprietary (Multi-investor) distribution channels have relatively more (less) 
transparent disclosure of LIHTC investments in their GAAP financial statements. Investors demanding 
guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the After_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax 
deductions in tax expense as offsets to revenue from the LIHTCs. Investors not demanding guarantees 
purchase LIHTCs through the Pre_Tax distribution channel, where investors report tax deductions as 
reductions to pre-tax earnings. Tax-exempt financing provides investors with accelerated depreciation 
relative to all other forms of financing. 
 
Panel B:  Sample description 
 Intersection of financing type and accounting treatment 
 
 Tax-Exempt Other Total 
After_Tax 420    577    997 
Pre_Tax 323 3,937 4,260 
Total 743 4,514 5,527 
 
Investors demanding guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the After_Tax distribution channel, where 
investors report tax deductions in tax expense as offsets to revenue from the LIHTCs. Investors not 
demanding guarantees purchase LIHTCs through the Pre_Tax distribution channel, where investors report 
tax deductions as reductions to pre-tax earnings. Tax-exempt financing provides investors with accelerated 
depreciation relative to all Other forms of financing. 
